In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

Nosotres, biólogues, ecologistas y otres profesionales dedicados a proteger la vida, les escribimos con una solicitud urgente. Les pedimos muy comedidamente que su organización o institución emita un comunicado oficial condenando la crisis en curso y abordando los impactos ambientales y humanitarios en Palestina.

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

This collection brings together fourteen contributions by authors from around the globe. Each of the contributions engages with questions about how local and global bioethical issues are made to be comparable, in the hope of redressing basic needs and demands for justice. These works demonstrate the significant conceptual contributions that can be made through feminists' attention to debates in a range of interrelated fields, especially as they formulate appropriate responses to developments in medical technology, global economics, population shifts, and poverty.

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

According to ecological psychology, animals perceive not just the qualities of things in their environment, but their affordances: in James Gibson’s words, ’what things furnish, for good or ill’. I propose a metaphysics for affordances that fits into a contemporary anti-Humean metaphysics of powers or potentialities. The goal is to connect two debates, one in the philosophy of perception and one in metaphysics, that stand to gain much from each other.

Dispositionalists try to provide an account of modality—possibility, necessity, and the counterfactual conditional—in terms of dispositions. But there may be a tension between dispositionalist accounts of possibility on the one hand, and of counterfactuals on the other. Dispositionalists about possibility must hold that there are no impossible dispositions, i.e., dispositions with metaphysically impossible stimulus and/or manifestation conditions; dispositionalist accounts of counterfactuals, if they allow for non-vacuous counterpossibles, require that there are such impossible dispositions. I argue, first, that there are in (...) fact no impossible dispositions; and second, that the dispositionalist can nevertheless acknowledge the non-vacuity of some counterpossibles. The strategy in the second part is one of ‘divide and conquer’ that is not confined to the dispositionalist: it consists in arguing that counterpossibles, when non-vacuous, are read epistemically and are therefore outside the purview of a dispositional account. (shrink)

Aristóteles ha sido considerado como el más grande biólogo de la antigüedad clásica, el primer zoólogo y el fundador de la anatomía comparada. En el presente ensayo examinaremos en qué medida el modelo normativo estipulado en los tratados lógicos se conforma a la recogida de datos empíricos presente en los tratados biológicos. En la segunda parte de la investigación examinaremos cómo los tratados lógicos habrían condicionado la explicación del funcionamiento del cerebro, llevando a Aristóteles a cometer un “error escandaloso”.

Medical diagnosis has been traditionally recognized as a privileged field of application for so called probabilistic induction. Consequently, the Bayesian theorem, which mathematically formalizes this form of inference, has been seen as the most adequate tool for quantifying the uncertainty surrounding the diagnosis by providing probabilities of different diagnostic hypotheses, given symptomatic or laboratory data. On the other side, it has also been remarked that differential diagnosis rather works by exclusion, e.g. by modus tollens, i.e. deductively. By drawing on a (...) case history, this paper aims at clarifying some points on the issue. Namely: 1) Medical diagnosis does not represent, strictly speaking, a form of induction, but a type, of what in Peircean terms should be called ‘abduction’ (identifying a case as the token of a specific type); 2) in performing the single diagnostic steps, however, different inferential methods are used for both inductive and deductive nature: modus tollens, hypothetical-deductive method, abduction; 3) Bayes’ theorem is a probabilized form of abduction which uses mathematics in order to justify the degree of confidence which can be entertained on a hypothesis given the available evidence; 4) although theoretically irreconcilable, in practice, both the hypothetical- deductive method and the Bayesian one, are used in the same diagnosis with no serious compromise for its correctness; 5) Medical diagnosis, especially differential diagnosis, also uses a kind of “probabilistic modus tollens”, in that, signs (symptoms or laboratory data) are taken as strong evidence for a given hypothesis not to be true: the focus is not on hypothesis confirmation, but instead on its refutation [Pr (¬ H/E1, E2, …, En)]. Especially at the beginning of a complicated case, odds are between the hypothesis that is potentially being excluded and a vague “other”. This procedure has the advantage of providing a clue of what evidence to look for and to eventually reduce the set of candidate hypotheses if conclusive negative evidence is found. 6) Bayes’ theorem in the hypothesis-confirmation form can more faithfully, although idealistically, represent the medical diagnosis when the diagnostic itinerary has come to a reduced set of plausible hypotheses after a process of progressive elimination of candidate hypotheses; 7) Bayes’ theorem is however indispensable in the case of litigation in order to assess doctor’s responsibility for medical error by taking into account the weight of the evidence at his disposal. (shrink)

Who and how revised Marxism in Poland? The simple answer is that it was done by young intellectuals seeing themselves as obligated to social and political activity, eager to participate in the process of the constitution of a new postwar Communist society. Marxism was for them a philosophical world-view and a political program rising hopes for a better socio-economic reality. Revisionists were committed Communists and their attitude toward Marxism was almost religious. Marxism, Promethean and scientific at the same time, was (...) supposed to replace religion, for which the radically secular revisionists saw no place in the new society. (See: Mikołajczyk 2013, p. 44-48) After the shock of 1956 they stuck by the slogan: ’socialism–yes, distortions–no,’ they thought that “Marxist socialism was possible without Leninist political forms, that Communism might be attacked within «the framework of Marxism»,” and they “believed for some time ... that Stalinism was curable in the sense that Communism could be restored or «democratized» without questioning its foundations” (Kolakowski 1978, p. 461). They saw themselves in an elitist way, i.e., as true and devoted Marxists fighting with dogmas, orthodoxy, myths, and unfounded faith both within Marxism-Leninism and outside it. They were willing to accept the position of sectarians, heretics, or apostates. Their political and ideological involvement forced them to attack pre-war but still active Polish philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School and other nonMarxist thinkers (Roman Ingarden, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Stanisław Ossowski), who were classified as “bourgeois thinkers” unable to understand and assimilate Marxism. (shrink)

A critique of dubious contrasts between "science" and "religion" drawn on the basis of cognitive-evolutionary accounts of human psychology, e.g.,. the claim that religious concepts are “likely” and “natural” for the human mind whereas scientific thinking is “rare” and “unnatural.” Initially made by biologist Lewis Wolpert in *The Unnatural Nature of Science* (1993) and anthropologist Pascal Boyer in *Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought* (2001), they are developed at length by philosopher R. N. McCauley in a*Why Religion is (...) Natural and Science is Not* (2011). These contrasts involve tendentiously narrow or broad definitions of the terms “science” and “religion” and the obliteration of the complex historical and intellectual relations between the ideas and practices currently identified by those terms. (shrink)

In this response to comments on my article, “The Chimera of Relativism,” in the same issue of *Common Knowledge* , by cognitive neuroscientist Andreas Roepstorff, classicist G. E. R. Lloyd, and anthropologist Martin Holbraad, I illustrate and reinforce Lloyd's cautions regarding the hazards of intercultural—here, Chinese-Western—comparisons in studies of culture and cognition. Examination of a foundational study in East-West cultural/cognitive differences cited by Roepstorff indicates extensive conceptual and methodological problems in that tradition of research. Although Holbraad champions a more radical (...) relativism than that offered in my work, the moves he urges have either been present in my work from the beginning or are both dubiously radical and otherwise undesirable. (shrink)

Abstract: Under traditional Jewish Law (halacha), assessment of human reproductive cloning (HRC) has been formulated along four lines of inquiry, which I discussed in Part I of this paper. Therein I also analyze five relevant doctrines of Talmudic Law, concluding that under with a risk-benefit analysis HRC fails to fulfill the obligation ‘to be fruitful and multiply’ and should be strictly prohibited. Here, I review of the topic from an exigetical Biblical and Kabbalistic perspective, beginning with exploring comments of the (...) Ramban (Nachmanides) which suggest Kabbalistic insights very much in keeping with current biology. In this Part II of the paper, I expand and annotate statements of the Ramban on the interrelationship of the reproductive faculties of an organism and its soul by examining the development of the spiritual states of plant, animal and human and noting the commensurate evolution with its reproductive facilities. Speculating that the reproductive mechanism of each species is indelibly related to its soul-state, I suggest that interfering with human sexual reproduction by HRC has the same effect the Ramban argues is the result of Kilayim (interbreeding), i.e., wrecking havoc with the Universe. In Part III, I postulate a biologic explanation for warnings found in the Golemic Literature and suggest that these allude to the importance of maintaining human genetic diversity through sexual reproduction. The conclusions I reached after evaluating the propriety of HRC under a Kabbalistic/metaphysical index comports with those I reached using a traditional legal /halachic inquiry in Part I. Thus, both systems arrive at the conclusion that HRC is in violation of the divine and natural order and constitute a distinct biological threat to the survival of the human species, a conclusions in accord with current scientific thinking. (shrink)

Aristotle was the first thinker to articulate a taxonomy of scientific knowledge, which he set out in Posterior Analytics. Furthermore, the “special sciences”, i.e., biology, zoology and the natural sciences in general, originated with Aristotle. A classical question is whether the mathematical axiomatic method proposed by Aristotle in the Analytics is independent of the special sciences. If so, Aristotle would have been unable to match the natural sciences with the scientific patterns he established in the Analytics. In this paper, I (...) reject this pessimistic approach towards the scientific value of natural sciences. I believe that there are traces of biology in the Analytics as well as traces of the Analytics’ theory in zoological treatises. Moreover, for a lack of chronological clarity, I think it’s better to unify Aristotle’s model of scientific research, which includes Analytics and the natural sciences together. (shrink)

El artículo tiene como objetivo describir las competencias informacionales a desarrollar durante la formación profesional. Se presenta los referentes teóricos a partir del empleo de un enfoque de sistema que supone el análisis y la síntesis, la inducción y la deducción como métodos de investigación, con el propósito de dar conocer los hitos en las universidades y organizaciones internacionales relacionadas. La modelación fue empleada para la construcción de un nuevo proyecto de desarrollo de competencias informacionales desde la perspectiva de la (...) formación profesional universitaria ajustada a las necesidades de la educación superior en Cuba. El nuevo proyecto se configura en tres unidades básicas (acceso, procesamiento y comunicación), con sus respectivos elementos de competencia, saberes esenciales e indicadores para la evaluación del desempeño. El artículo fundamenta la tesis de que el desarrollo de competencias informacionales debe ser sistemáticamente estructurado, planificado y ejecutado como parte integral de la formación curricular en interacción con los contenidos de las disciplinas docentes, bajo la dirección del profesor y la participación protagónica de los profesionales en formación. -/- ABSTRACT -/- The article aims at describing the competence to be developed during professional training. It presents the theoretical referents by means of an approach system that includes synthesis and analysis, induction and deduction as research methods in order to reveal the milestones of information skills development in universities and related international organizations. Modeling was used for the construction of a new skills development project from the perspective of university professional training according to the needs of Higher Education in Cuba. The new project is composed of three basic units (access, processing and communication), with their respective competence elements, essential knowledge and indicators for the evaluation of the performance. The article supports the theory that information development skills must be systematically structured, planned and implemented as an integral part of the curricular training in interaction with the contents of subjects, under the teacher´s guidance and the active participation of profesionals in training. -/- . (shrink)

Recreational Drugs European Network (ReDNet) project aims to use the Psychonaut Web Mapping Project database (Psychonaut Web Mapping Group, 2009) containing novel psychoactive compounds usually not mentioned in the scientific literature and thus unknown to clinicians as a unique source of information. The database will be used to develop an integrated ICT prevention approach targeted at vulnerable individuals and focused on novel synthetic and herbal compounds and combinations. Particular care will be taken in keeping the health professionals working directly with (...) young people showing problematic behaviors regularly updated in terms of novel compounds and combinations as well. A user-friendly project website will be developed aimed primarily at delivering the information/prevention approaches, but will also be a way of communicating with project partners and relevant stakeholders (e.g. thematic forum facilities, instant messages, blogs, video chat, wikiblog, newsletters distributed via mailing list). The website will support various ICT prevention tools, including an SMS alert service. Different areas and sections will be aimed specifically at the different target groups. -/- . (shrink)

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The MRCT Center Post-trial Responsibilities: Continued Access to an Investigational Medicine Framework outlines a case-based, principled, stakeholder approach to evaluate and guide ethical responsibilities to provide continued access to an investigational medicine at the conclusion of a patient’s participation in a clinical trial. The Post-trial Responsibilities (PTR) Framework includes this Guidance Document as well as the accompanying Toolkit. A 41-member international multi-stakeholder Workgroup convened by the Multi-Regional Clinical Trials Center of Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Harvard University (...) (MRCT Center) developed this Guidance and Toolkit. Project Motivation A number of international organizations have discussed the responsibilities stakeholders have to provide continued access to investigational medicines. The World Medical Association, for example, addressed post-trial access to medicines in Paragraph 34 of the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA, 2013): “In advance of a clinical trial, sponsors, researchers and host country governments should make provisions for post-trial access for all participants who still need an intervention identified as beneficial in the trial. This information must also be disclosed to participants during the informed consent process.” This paragraph and other international guidance documents converge on several consensus points: • Post-trial access (hereafter referred to as “continued access” in this Framework [for terminology clarification – see definitions]) is the responsibility of sponsors, researchers, and host country governments; • The plan for continued access should be determined before the trial begins, and before any individual gives their informed consent; • The protocol should delineate continued access plans; and • The plan should be transparent to potential participants and explained during the informed consent process. -/- However, there is no guidance on how to fulfill these responsibilities (i.e., linking specific responsibilities with specific stakeholders, conditions, and duration). To fill this gap, the MRCT Center convened a working group in September of 2014 to develop a framework to guide stakeholders with identified responsibilities. This resultant Framework sets forth applicable principles, approaches, recommendations and ethical rationales for PTR regarding continued access to investigational medicines for research participants. (shrink)

When a piece of fruit is in a bowl, and the bowl is on a table, we appreciate not only the individual objects and their features, but also the relations containment and support, which abstract away from the particular objects involved. Independent representation of roles (e.g., containers vs. supporters) and “fillers” of those roles (e.g., bowls vs. cups, tables vs. chairs) is a core principle of language and higherlevel reasoning. But does such role-filler independence also arise in automatic visual processing? (...) Here, we show that it does, by exploring a surprising error that such independence can produce. In four experiments, participants saw a stream of images containing different objects arranged in forcedynamic relations — e.g., a phone contained in a basket, a marker resting on a garbage can, or a knife sitting in a cup. Participants had to respond to a single target image (e.g., a phone in a basket) within a stream of distractors presented under time constraints. Surprisingly, even though participants completed this task quickly and accurately, they false-alarmed more often to images matching the target’s relational category than to those that did not — even when those images involved completely different objects. In other words, participants searching for a phone in a basket were more likely to mistakenly respond to a knife in a cup than to a marker on a garbage can. Follow-up experiments ruled out strategic responses and also controlled for various confounding image features. We suggest that visual processing represents relations abstractly, in ways that separate roles from fillers. (shrink)

The notion of information processing has dominated the study of the mind for over six decades. However, before the advent of cognitivism, one of the most prominent theoretical ideas was that of Habit. This is a concept with a rich and complex history, which is again starting to awaken interest, following recent embodied, enactive critiques of computationalist frameworks. We offer here a very brief history of the concept of habit in the form of a genealogical network-map. This serves to provide (...) an overview of the richness of this notion and as a guide for further re-appraisal. We identify 77 thinkers and their influences, and group them into seven schools of thought. Two major trends can be distinguished. One is the associationist trend, starting with the work of Locke and Hume, developed by Hartley, Bain, and Mill to be later absorbed into behaviorism through pioneering animal psychologists (Morgan and Thorndike). This tradition conceived of habits atomistically and as automatisms (a conception later debunked by cognitivism). Another historical trend we have called organicism inherits the legacy of Aristotle and develops along German idealism, French spiritualism, pragmatism, and phenomenology. It feeds into the work of continental psychologists in the early 20th century, influencing important figures such as Merleau-Ponty, Piaget, and Gibson. But it has not yet been taken up by mainstream cognitive neuroscience and psychology. Habits, in this tradition, are seen as ecological, self-organizing structures that relate to a web of predispositions and plastic dependencies both in the agent and in the environment. In addition, they are not conceptualized in opposition to rational, volitional processes, but as transversing a continuum from reflective to embodied intentionality. These are properties that make habit a particularly attractive idea for embodied, enactive perspectives, which can now re-evaluate it in light of dynamical systems theory and complexity research. (shrink)

In discussion on consciousness and the hard problem, there is an unquestioned background assumption, namely, our experience is stored in the brain. Yet Bergson argued that this very question, “Is experience stored in the brain?” is the critical issue in the problem of consciousness. His examination of then-current memory research led him, save for motor or procedural memory, to a “no” answer. Others, for example Sheldrake, have continued this negative assessment of the research findings. So, has this assumption actually been (...) proven since Bergson? Do we know how experience is stored? Or that it is stored? Here, a recent review and model of memory is examined to see where this assumption actually stands. Again, the assessment will be that nothing has changed. The core of the problem, it will be argued, lies in two things: Firstly, the search for how/where experience is stored is motivated—rephrasing Bergson—in the classic metaphysic, a framework on space and time whose logic cannot be coherently, logically adhered to in attempting to explain how experience is stored. Secondly, the search generally assumes an inadequate theory of perception that is implicitly based in this classic metaphysic. If framed within Bergson’s model of perception and his temporal metaphysic, conjoined with J. J. Gibson’s model, the storage-search appears misguided from the start. (shrink)

Ambient assisted living technologies are increasingly presented and sold as essential smart additions to daily life and home environments that will radically transform the healthcare and wellness markets of the future. An ethical approach and a thorough understanding of all ethics in surveillance/monitoring architectures are therefore pressing. AAL poses many ethical challenges raising questions that will affect immediate acceptance and long-term usage. Furthermore, ethical issues emerge from social inequalities and their potential exacerbation by AAL, accentuating the existing access gap between (...) high-income countries and low and middle-income countries. Legal aspects mainly refer to the adherence to existing legal frameworks and cover issues related to product safety, data protection, cybersecurity, intellectual property, and access to data by public, private, and government bodies. Successful privacy-friendly AAL applications are needed, as the pressure to bring Internet of Things devices and ones equipped with artificial intelligence quickly to market cannot overlook the fact that the environments in which AAL will operate are mostly private. The social issues focus on the impact of AAL technologies before and after their adoption. Future AAL technologies need to consider all aspects of equality such as gender, race, age and social disadvantages and avoid increasing loneliness and isolation among, e.g. older and frail people. Finally, the current power asymmetries between the target and general populations should not be underestimated nor should the discrepant needs and motivations of the target group and those developing and deploying AAL systems. Whilst AAL technologies provide promising solutions for the health and social care challenges, they are not exempt from ethical, legal and social issues. A set of ELSI guidelines is needed to integrate these factors at the research and development stage. (shrink)

The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must examine (...) the classical, spatial metaphysic of space and time, for practical purposes initiated by Galileo, wherein the real has been equated with the quantitative and wherein quality has been stripped from the material world. In this metaphysic, which sees form as quantitative or computable, the origin of qualia is problematic, with a problem of even greater primacy becoming the “memory” that supports the transforming events of perception, e.g., rotating cubes, buzzing flies, twisting leaves. It is this memory, supporting time-extended, flowing events, that necessarily supports all qualia. The concept of storage of “snapshots” of time-flowing events, a notion which the classic metaphysic engenders, is unworkable as a solution to the perception of these flows. Form, in fact being dynamic and defined over flowing fields, equally is a quality, equally requires this memory, and since forms populate the image, the origin of the entire image is indeed a problem. The counter-proposal becomes Bergson’s temporal metaphysic wherein motion is indivisible (or non-differentiable), the global motion of the universal field itself then carrying an intrinsic form of memory. In this framework, with this field viewed as holographic, Bergson provides a unique solution – one that leaves the problem of representation behind – as to how the brain specifies the qualitative image of the dynamically transforming external world. (shrink)

The Cell Ontology (CL) is designed to provide a standardized representation of cell types for data annotation. Currently, the CL employs multiple is_a relations, defining cell types in terms of histological, functional, and lineage properties, and the majority of definitions are written with sufficient generality to hold across multiple species. This approach limits the CL’s utility for cross-species data integration. To address this problem, we developed a method for the ontological representation of cells and applied this method to develop a (...) dendritic cell ontology (DC-CL). DC-CL subtypes are delineated on the basis of surface protein expression, systematically including both species-general and species-specific types and optimizing DC-CL for the analysis of flow cytometry data. This approach brings benefits in the form of increased accuracy, support for reasoning, and interoperability with other ontology resources. 104. Barry Smith, “Toward a Realistic Science of Environments”, Ecological Psychology, 2009, 21 (2), April-June, 121-130. Abstract: The perceptual psychologist J. J. Gibson embraces a radically externalistic view of mind and action. We have, for Gibson, not a Cartesian mind or soul, with its interior theater of contents and the consequent problem of explaining how this mind or soul and its psychological environment can succeed in grasping physical objects external to itself. Rather, we have a perceiving, acting organism, whose perceptions and actions are always already tuned to the parts and moments, the things and surfaces, of its external environment. We describe how on this basis Gibson sought to develop a realist science of environments which will be ‘consistent with physics, mechanics, optics, acoustics, and chemistry’. (shrink)

L'articolo usa la teoria delle parti, del tutto e dei contomi per elaborare alcune relazioni cruciali tra la «psicologia ecologica» di J.J. Gibson e la fenomenologia di Husserl. Presenta, inoltre, una teoria ontologica dei contomi spaziali e delle entita spazialmente estese, applicandola al cam po visivo, qui concepito come un' entita spazialmente estesa dipendente dal soggetto che percepisce. Su questa base e possibile formulare un nuovo tipo di definizione teoretico-correspondentista della verita per gli enunciati del linguaggio naturale.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a relação entre os conceitos de percepção-ação e cognição incorporada (CI) no âmbito das críticas desenvolvidas por Varela ao realismo ecológico gibsoniano. No livro The embodied mind, Varela, Thompson e Rosh (1993) elaboram o conceito de enaction, o qual expressa que a percepção consiste em ação guiada através de estruturas cognitivas que emergem dos padrões sensoriomotores na relação corpo-ambiente. Essas estruturas cognitivas não são representadas, mas incorporadas na ação que surge do acoplamento da nossa (...) estrutura corporal com o ambiente. Nesse sentido, apesar da abordagem de Varela et al (1993) em relação à percepção ser anti-representacionista semelhante proposta por Gibson, há divergências entre ambos no que concerne à concepção de percepção direta gibsoniana e à relação de mutualidade organismo-ambiente. Tais concepções envolvem os conceitos de invariantes, os quais segundo Gibson, são propriedades informacionais do ambiente que constituem as affordances, que por sua vez, podem ser caracterizadas como possibilidades de ação que o ambiente proporciona aos organismos. Desse modo, segundo Varela, na concepção gibsoniana, o ambiente independe do organismo, diferentemente do conceito de enaction, para o qual ambiente e organismo estão acoplados, construindo histórias evolutivas. Varela critica a posição gibsoniana devido ao fato de que para ele, Gibson elaborou a teoria da percepção a partir do ambiente, mas não do acoplamento organismo-ambiente. Nesse sentido, a relação de mutualidade entre organismo-ambiente proposta por Gibson para designar o conceito anti-representacionista de percepção direta não é adequado dado que tal conceito prioriza somente um lado relacionado ao do ambiente, deixando pendente a relação que deveria ser de mutualidade ou de acoplamento. Nessa apresentação, procuro argumentar que, ao contrário do que afirma Varela, a CI oferece uma teoria da percepção direta na medida em que focaliza as capacidades sensório-motoras dos organismos na sua relação de mutualidade com o ambiente. Para isso, ressalto as características ontológicas e epistemológicas do conceito de affordance no contexto da teoria ecológica gibsoniana, de forma a mostrar suas implicações para a relação de mutualidade organismo-ambiente no contexto do realismo ecológico proposto por Gibson (1986). (shrink)

A tese da mente estendida alega que ao menos alguns processos cognitivos se estendem para além do cérebro do organismo no sentido de que eles são constituídos por ações realizadas por esse organismo no ambiente ao seu redor. Um movimento mais radical seria alegar que ações sociais realizadas pelo organismo poderiam pelo menos constituir alguns dos seus processos cognitivos. Isso pode ser chamando de tese da mente socialmente estendida. Baseando-me na noção de affordance tal como ela foi desenvolvida na tradição (...) da psicologia ecológica, eu defendo que a percepção se estende ao meio ambiente. Então, apoiado no fenômeno da atenção conjunta, eu estendo a noção de affordance para encorporar affordances sociais. Assim, a percepção pode, em algumas situações, ser também estendida socialmente. (shrink)

INTRODUÇÃO A FORMAÇÃO DO ESTADO E DA POLÍTICA -/- Não existe a fixação exata de quando se formou a primeira organização política, entendida esta como uma relação assimétrica, em que um, ou alguns, governam e a grande maioria é governada. Pode ter sido em Jericó, na Palestina, onde se encontrou uma velha muralha de pedra, de dez mil anos atrás, supondo-se ter abrigado de dois a três mil habitantes. A diferença possível de se fixar era de que, antes, havia apenas (...) aldeias cujas organizações eram tribais ou de clãs, onde as relações eram simétricas, cujo chefe apenas representava o grupo enquanto expressasse a vontade do mesmo. Existe, então, uma grande diferença, entre uma organização política, ainda que representando apenas o povo de uma cidade, e as organizações não políticas, pois na primeira existe um governo, responsável pelo destino de todos, enquanto nessas outras o chefe trata-se apenas da exteriorização da vontade do grupo. -/- Da primeira cidade palestina, a outras que se formaram, principalmente na Suméria, surgiram as primeiras organizações políticas. Das cidades independentes da região, ao Egito antigo e aos impérios da Ásia Menor, cada vez mais o poder político exteriorizava uma diferenciação social profunda, em que a grande maioria produzia para alguns poucos e a produção era organizada pelo poder estatal. De forma análoga, houve os regimes políticos no -/- subcontinente indiano, na China e na Mesoamérica. -/- Depois, ocorreu o alvorecer das polis gregas, inicialmente governadas por monarquias, em seguida por aristocracias, até que algumas chegaram às democracias antigas, como o caso de Atenas. A função política aí era vista como um dever da cidadania e, não, como um privilégio, tanto que diversos cargos eram atribuídos por meio de sorteios e a instância máxima era uma assembleia, dos cidadãos, excluindo mulheres, estrangeiros e escravos. A sofisticação cultural e política grega permitiu que houvesse diversos pensadores incumbidos de entender o enigma da política. -/- O Império romano, também, teve alto grau de sofisticação, especialmente quanto às funções públicas. Houve, inicialmente, uma realeza, depois um sistema aristocrático até que se chegou muito perto das democracias representativas, no chamado governo misto, em que existiam dois cônsules, para representar a monarquia, o senado dos patrícios, relativo à aristocracia, e a assembleia da plebe, tido como o elemento democrático. O modelo acima criou diversas influências, principalmente para o Mundo Ocidental, em instituições como o Município. -/- O Völkerwanderugen, as invasões bárbaras nas áreas do Império romano, destruíram as instituições tradicionais, mas conservaram algumas, como o commendatio, o beneficium e o immunitas, que colaboraram com o perfil das organizações feudais. Por outro lado, o mundo germânico, ainda baseado num sistema de clã e, não, na forma estatal, contribuiu com o gefolgschaft, ou séquito, um vínculo pessoal de lealdade e afeição entre um líder guerreiro e sua comitiva de colaboradores. O mundo feudal nasceu desses institutos, em que cada castelo converteu-se em um centro de governo independente do poder central. -/- O sistema acima confluiu para o ständestaat, entendida como uma comunidade política de estados, significando estes como ordem ou classe social representada nas antigas assembleias -/- ou cortes. O ingresso de cidades independentes do castelo feudal, muitas vezes comprando ou lutando pela liberdade, mudou o cenário político, com aquelas se voltando para o poder central, contra o poder fracionado que lhes ameaçavam mais. -/- Houve, então, um fortalecimento do governo central e absorção de territórios menores e mais fracos pelos maiores e mais fortes, chegando à formação de um número pequeno de Estados independentes entre si, cada um se afirmando como soberano. O poder político, então, aí pode ser entendido como uma relação simétrica entre os Estados soberanos e uma relação assimétrica entre o Estado e os súditos. Houve, com isso, a formação dos Estados absolutistas, cuja “autoridade assentava agora exclusivamente no monarca, que tinha reunido em si todas as prerrogativas públicas de governo efetivo”. A própria denominação Estado nasceu, na Itália, a partir da palavra status, que indicava a situação pessoal do dirigente que formara em torno de si uma organização política territorial. O Estado moderno, o absolutista, ou nacional, em que todas expressões que significam um novo tipo de organização, jamais visto antes, tinha o poder político como em decorrência de uma decisão racional da sociedade, para melhor se defender dos perigos da anarquia e da violência. -/- Do sistema absolutista, houve um processo de aquisição de cidadania, entendida esta como uma situação concernente aos membros integrais de uma comunidade, com iguais direitos obrigações. A cidadania civil, inicialmente, concedia direitos necessários à liberdade individual, começando a ser atribuída nos séculos XVII a XVIII, a partir da Revolução Inglesa, em 1688, da Revolução Americana, em 1776, e da Revolução Francesa, em 1789. Foi a época em que o discurso político esteve voltado para a ideia do contrato social, com suas diversas matizes, mas caracterizado pelo processo de constitucionalização do Estado. -/- Depois, veio a chamada cidadania política, com o poder de escolher e ser escolhido representante no governo ou no parlamento e, também, de se manifestar sobre o comportamento das instituições, inicialmente no século XVIII, mas que se consolidou no século XIX até o século XX, quando finalmente as mulheres passaram a ter direito ao voto. A forma de democratizar o Estado foi, então, se atribuir a cidadania política a cada vez maior número de pessoas, sendo esta a principal preocupação do pensamento liberal, contestado pelo pensamento marxista, visto como insuficiente para a igualdade social. -/- Por fim, veio a cidadania social, entendida como o direito ao bem-estar econômico, com direito a remunerações compatíveis com a dignidade humana, bem como os benefícios do sistema educacional e de saúde e dos serviços sociais, direitos pleiteados no século XIX, mas só reconhecidos devidamente no século XX. Não foi um processo simples, mas complexo, que assistiu a consolidação em textos constitucionais como a Constituição mexicana, em 1917, a Declaração do Povo Oprimido e Trabalhador da Rússia, em 1918, e, finalmente, a Constituição de Weimar, em 1919. Todas as lutas pela cidadania acabaram mudando o aspecto do Estado e, em consequência, do poder político. Já agora, no século XXI, existe uma preocupação com a forma pela qual o poder é exercido. Em primeiro lugar, aparece a racionalização técnica como a forma de discurso e de comunicação, cuja informática e a Internet são sua exteriorização mais evidente. Em segundo lugar, as fusões das grandes instituições econômicas fazem com que elas superem em poder econômico a grande maioria dos Estados independentes. Em terceiro lugar, ocorre o processo de massacre da individualidade, em nome da chamada globalização. Em quarto, surge a ameaça física à espécie humana, em razão da poluição e da violação dos ecossistemas, gerando uma nova pressão de cidadania pelos direitos de última geração. Por fim, existe a visível mudança das organizações políticas, através de macroestruturas, inicialmente de conteúdo econômico, mas que mudam para novas formas políticas, como a União Europeia e, talvez, o Unasul, na América do Sul. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - Técnico em Agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim. Normalista pela Escola Frei Cassiano Comacchio. (shrink)

Neste texto, apresento e examino as principais ideias que animam a abordagem ecológica da percepção. Primeiro, na Seção 2, apresento a visão instantânea da percepção, contra a qual Gibson articula e propõe a abordagem ecológica. Em seguida, na Seção 3, apresento e discuto a noção de informação ecológica. Nas seções 4 e 5 articulo a teoria das affordances e discuto a aprendizagem perceptiva. Por fim, na Seção 6, exponho e discuto a possibilidade de estender a teoria das affordances para (...) explicar a cognição social. (shrink)

The dual role of olfaction in both smelling and tasting, i.e. flavour perception, makes it an important test case for philosophical theories of sensory individuation. Indeed, the psychologist Paul Rozin claimed that olfaction is a “dual sense”, leading some scientists and philosophers to propose that we have not one, but two senses of smell: orthonasal and retronasal olfaction. In this paper I consider how best to understand Rozin’s claim, and upon what grounds one might judge there to be one or (...) two distinct olfactory modalities. I conclude that while Rozin may be right that humans have dual occurrences of an olfactory ‘sense’, the concept of a sense-modality, and hence the ‘sense’ of smell, is ambiguous between two different notions: a physiological sensory channel and an experiential modality, along the lines suggested by J. J. Gibson. Furthermore, recognising that these are complementary rather than competing conceptions of a sense-modality enables the formulation of a powerful ‘dual-concept’ framework for posing and addressing questions concerning the complex architecture of human multisensory experience. (shrink)

This special issue on affordances bases on the thesis, that all natural and artificial things inhere affordances that appeal to our cognitive system, and thus invite us to look at them, perceive them, think about them, interpret them, and use them. The concept roots in the studies of the American psychologist James J. Gibson from the 1960s. According to him, "things" offer a certain range of possible activities depending on their form, time patterns, and material qualities, thus becoming part (...) of human-thing-interactions. However, affordances can also be culturally trained. This aspect has been intensively discussed subsequently within different disciplines (e.g., Social Sciences, Design Studies). But only recently has the concept received attention in the field of Visual Culture Studies particularly through archaeological scholarship. (shrink)

This paper (1) criticizes Patzig's explanation of Aristotle's reason for calling his first figure syllogisms perfect syllogisms, i.e. the transitivity relation: it can only be used for Barbara, not for the other three moods. The paper offers (2) an alternative interpretation: It is only in the case of the (perfect) first figure moods that we can move from the subject term of the minor premiss, taken to be a predicate of an individual, to the predicate term of the major (...) premiss. This contention is supported (i) by Aristotle's wording of the dictum de omni et nullo and (ii) by Aristotle's use of a formula which puts the minor term in the first position when he first states Barbara and Celarent. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.2 (2001) 215-232 [Access article in PDF] Eighteenth-Century Print Culture and the "Truth" of Fictional Narrative Lisa Zunshine As a session entitled "Truth" at a recent Modern Language Association of America annual convention has demonstrated, the obsession with the epistemologies of truth is alive and well. Our "familiar ways of thinking and talking about truth," as one of the speakers, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, observed, remain (...) "theoretically elusive, discursively slippery, and hard or perhaps impossible to articulate clearly in relation to other current concepts and ideas" 1 --an irresistible invitation to further thinking and talking on the subject. My essay enters this conversation by attempting to contemplate truth not as a stable attribute but as a ongoing attribution, that is, not as an inherent property but rather as a dynamic process predicated upon functional idiosyncrasies of our evolved cognitive architecture. The broad question posed here is this: What if our never-ending quest for truth is itself cognitively constructed and the various forms that this quest takes manifest the (not necessarily harmonious) interaction between our evolved cognitive capacities and the ever-changing specifics of our cultural environment?Consider just one of the forms of such an interaction, namely, our age-long preoccupation with the "truth" of literary narrative. In many respects, this preoccupation is counterproductive: the most "fantastic" story contains a number of contingently useful "truths" about the world, whereas the most "factual" narrative manipulates facts by virtue of being a narrative or a subjective arrangementof information. Still, we persevere in wanting to put the label "fiction" or "nonfiction" onto any story that comes our way. As I will argue, the bookstore's organization of its sections satisfies this species of "cognitive" craving as well as [End Page 215] reinforces it, making it seem culturally inevitable. Viewed from this perspective, our culture appears to be a multifaceted feedback mechanism engaged in the process of satisfying, reinforcing, struggling with, and manipulating our cognitive predispositions.The cultural manipulation of our cognitive predispositions is the topic of the present essay, which discusses several examples of such manipulation that respond to our desire to assign a certain "truth-value" to a given narrative, i.e., to attach a label to it announcing its "factuality" or "fictionality." "Truth-value" is a loaded term, resisting definition, and liable to lead me into trouble. Imperfect as it is, however, I need it in order to shuffle between two scholarly discourses that do not (yet) have much vocabulary in common: literary criticism and cognitive science. The reason for turning to cognitive science in my discussion of literary narrative is that cognitive anthropologists and psychologists frequently engage the same problems that we do when we ask, What is "Fiction"? How is it different from "History"? How do we decide whether what we are reading is "true?" The key difference between the two approaches is, however, that whereas the literary critic focuses on specific texts produced and read in specific cultural circumstances, the cognitive anthropologist pays attention to the cross-cultural insistence with which people wish to and often claim to distinguish "truth" from "fiction" and inquires into the possible evolutionary history of the cognitive architecture implicated in our never-ending quest for "truth." The latter perspective can thus be useful for literary studies because, by suggesting that our evolved cognitive architecture often "encourages" us to construe the world as a negotiation of "truths" and "nontruths," this perspective begins to account--at least on some level--for the fact that people may approach a complex cultural artifact, such as a novel, with a "truth"/"non-truth" binary in mind that is ultimately not very productive. 2 Evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists frequently point to disjunctions between the tasks that our brain evolved to solve and the tasks that we have to deal with in the modern environment; our vexed insistence on determining the truth-value of the 500-page printed narrative--not an object one would come across in the Pleistocene--can be seen as yet another instance of such a disjunction.Thus, I suggest that, on the... (shrink)

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator: The Final Paradigm By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. Imprint 1.0. 2024. All Rights are reserved. Intended copies of this work can be used for research and teaching. No change in the content and must include my full name, Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Enjoying reading and disagreeing. Publisher: Kuhn von Verden Verlag. Language: English and German. Includes bibliographical references and an index. Pages 1-316. Index total pages is 524. Ontology. (...) 2. Metaphysics. 3. Philosophy, German. 4. Thought and thinking. 5. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. 6. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854. 7. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. 10. Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century. 11. Philosophy, Modern -- 19th century. 12. Practice (Philosophy). 13. Philosophy and civilization. 14. Postmodernism. 15. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. 16. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. 17. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel. Table of Contents Mottos Division I. Discussion of the title pages 2-6 Prologue pages 7-14 Heidegger, what do we know about him? page 15-22 Early Heidegger pages 23-41 What are the periods in Heidegger’s thought? pages 42-51 Preface and Setting the Stage pages 52-65 Introduction pages 66-82 Heidegger on Questioning pages 83-94 The Crisis or Krisis in philosophy? pages 95-106 Does Heidegger have a philosophy? pages 107-127 Heidegger about the Nature of Teaching pages 128-132 Heidegger against philosophy as a worldview or the standpoint of standpointlessness pages 133-137 Heidegger’s world-famous book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, SuZ, 1927) pages 138-153 Heidegger’s second attempt Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) pages 154-162 Heidegger on the image of the Bridge pages 163-170 Conclusion pages 171-188 -/- Division II. Engagement with Heidegger on history of philosophy (metaphysics). Reinigung as cleaning, purifying pages 189-191 What is Heidegger’s Metahistory of philosophy? pages 192-243 Appendix A. Reconstruction of a partial letter from Martin Heidegger to Dieter Sinn. Dated. 24 August 1964. pages 244-248 Appendix B. Martin Heidegger's Dialogue and Critical Debate with Hegel. pages 249-253 Appendix C. Heidegger on Pain (Schmerz) pages 254-257 Appendix D. Update: 2023 Oct 24. Daniel Fidel Ferrer replies to Professor Thomas Sheehan (Sein question) pages 258-269 Appendix E. Five Habilitations done with Martin Heidegger. Habilitationsschrift pages 270-272 Heidegger Bibliography Individual Lectures Vortrag or Vorträge. Detailed pages 273-294 Heidegger‘s Gesamtausgabe (HGA or GA). Note GA 72 has yet to be published (2024). pages 295-299 Letters. Briefe. Briefwechsel. Not complete pages 300-303 Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien / Etudes Heideggeriennes (list of Heidegger texts) pages 304-305 Jahresgaben der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft (from the internet) (list of Heidegger texts) pages 306-308 Additional References (bibliographies) pages 309-310 Heidegger Index Projects by Daniel Fidel Ferrer page 311 -/- Martin Heidegger Audio Recordings pages 312-313 -/- Additional acknowledgements pages 314-315 -/- Letter from Hermann Heidegger to Daniel Ferrer den 5.2.2002. In German. Hermann Heidegger’s response to the Barbara Fiand collection being in the USA. -/- One of the thesis: there is no Heidegger philosophy. Read more… -/- “What always counts in the lecture-courses is the manner of proceeding - the sequence of steps - not a claim to final truths. The lecture-courses never wrap up in a completeness and in seemingly "finishing off" the works interpreted, but rather in the inner fullness of the hidden dynamics of questioning.” GA 66. Besinnung (1938/39). GA 66: 421. (shrink)

Die zeitgenössischen Philosophen haben zwar der Sprache, die wir verwenden, um die Welt der alltäglichen Erfahrung zu beschreiben oder um uns in dieser Welt zurechtzufinden, große Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt, sie haben sich jedoch – von einigen Ausnahmen abgesehen – geweigert, diese Welt selbst als passendes Objekt theoretischer Betrachtungen anzusehen. Im folgenden werde ich versuchen zu zeigen, wie es möglich ist, die Common-Sense-Welt als ontologisch eigenständiges Untersuchungsobjekt zu verstehen. Gleichzeitig werde ich mich bemühen, deutlich zu zeigen, wie eine solch eigenständige Behandlung uns (...) möglicherweise hilft, die Strukturen sowohl der physikalischen Welt als auch der menschlichen Erkenntnis philosophisch besser zu verstehen. (shrink)

In this chapter, I put forward and sustain an articulation of the notion of bodily skill based on ecological psychology, and I show how it is relevant for the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about skillful coping and also for the debate about whether know-how is reducible or not to propositional knowledge. The right metaphor to understand bodily skills is not the computer metaphor but the radio metaphor. These skills result from a process of organism attunement to its environment.

What is the relation between works of fiction and the acquisition of knowledge?

Cognitivism in respect to the arts refers to a constellation of positions that share in common the idea that artworks often bear, in addition to aesthetic value, a significant kind of cognitive value. In this paper I concentrate on three things: (i) the challenge of understanding exactly what one must do if one wishes to defend a cognitivist view of the arts; (ii) common anti-cognitivist arguments; and (iii) promising recent attempts to defend cognitivism.

This paper surveys recent "new actualist" approaches to modality that do without possible worlds and locate modality squarely in the actual world. New actualist theories include essentialism and dispositionalism about modality, each of which can come in different varieties. The commonalities and differences between these views, as well as their shared motivations, are layed out.

A viable theory of literary humanism must do justice to the idea that literature offers cognitive rewards to the careful reader. There are, however, powerful arguments to the effect that literature is at best only capable of offering idle visions of a world already well known. In this essay I argue that there is a form of cognitive awareness left unmentioned in the traditional vocabulary of knowledge acquisition, a form of awareness literature is particularly capable of offering. Thus even if (...) it is the case that literature has nothing interesting to give us in the way of knowledge, the literary humanist can consistently maintain that literary experience is thoroughly cognitive. (shrink)

Dispositions are modal properties. The standard conception of dispositions holds that each disposition is individuated by its stimulus condition(s) and its manifestation(s), and that their modality is best captured by some conditional construction that relates stimulus to manifestation as antecedent to consequent. I propose an alternative conception of dispositions: each disposition is individuated by its manifestation alone, and its modality is closest to that of possibility — a fragile vase, for instance, is one that can break easily. The view is (...) expounded in some detail and defended against the major objections. (shrink)

Abilities are in many ways central to what being an agent means, and they are appealed to in philosophical accounts of a great many different phenomena. It is often assumed that abilities are some kind of dispositional property, but it is rarely made explicit exactly which dispositional properties are our abilities. Two recent debates provide two different answers to that question: the new dispositionalism in the debate about free will, and virtue reliabilism in epistemology. This paper argues that both answers (...) fail as general accounts of abilities, and discusses the ramifications of this result. (shrink)

It is often assumed that literary meaning is essentially linguistic in nature and that literary interpretation is therefore a purely linguistic affair. This essay identifies a variety of literary meaning that cannot be reduced to linguistic meaning. Meaning of this sort is generated not by a communicative act so much as through a creative one: the construction of a fictional world. The way in which a fictional world can bear meaning turns out to be strikingly unlike the way a sentence (...) can, and this, I argue, has important implications for the theory of interpretation. (shrink)

It is a familiar point that many ordinary dispositions are multi-track, that is, not fully and adequately characterisable by a single conditional. In this paper, I argue that both the extent and the implications of this point have been severely underestimated. First, I provide new arguments to show that every disposition whose stimulus condition is a determinable quantity must be infinitely multi-track. Secondly, I argue that this result should incline us to move away from the standard assumption that dispositions are (...) in some way importantly linked to conditionals, as presupposed by the debate about various versions of the ‘conditional analysis’ of dispositions. I introduce an alternative conception of dispositionality, which is motivated by linguistic observations about dispositional adjectives and links dispositions to possibility instead of conditionals. I argue that, because of the multi-track nature of dispositions, the possibility-based conception of dispositions is to be preferred. (shrink)

According to essentialism, metaphysical modality is founded in the essences of things, where the essence of a thing is roughly akin to its real definition. According to potentialism (also known as dispositionalism), metaphysical modality is founded in the potentialities of things, where a potentiality is roughly the generalized notion of a disposition. Essentialism and potentialism have much in common, but little has been written about their relation to each other. The aim of this paper is to understand better the relations (...) between essence and potentiality, on the one hand, and between essentialism and potentialism, on the other. It is argued, first, that essence and potentiality are not duals but interestingly linked by a weaker relation dubbed ‘semi-duality’; second, that given this weaker relation, essentialism and potentialism are not natural allies but rather natural competitors; and third, that the semi-duality of essence and potentiality allows the potentialist to respond to an important explanatory challenge by using essentialist resources without thereby committing to essentialism. (shrink)